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The fields of pattern recognition and machine learning can arguably be
considered as a modern-day incarnation of an endeavor which has challenged
mankind since antiquity. In fact, fundamental questions pertaining to induc-
tion, categorization, abstraction, causality, etc., have been on the agenda of
mainstream philosophy, under different names and guises, since its inception.
With the advent of modern digital computers and the availability of enor-
mous amount of raw data, these questions have now taken a computational
flavor.
As it often happens with scientific research, in the early days of pat-
tern recognition there used to be a genuine interest around philosophical
and conceptual issues, but over time the interest shifted almost entirely to
technical and algorithmic aspects and became driven mainly by practical
applications. With this reality in mind, it is instructive to remark that al-
though the dismissal of philosophical inquiry at times of intense incremental
scientific progress is understandable to allow time for the immediate needs of
problem-solving, it is also sometimes responsible for preventing or delaying
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the emergence of true scientific progress.
In recent years there has been an increasing interest around the foun-
dational and/or philosophical problems of pattern recognition and machine
learning, from both the computer scientist’s and the philosopher’s camps.1
This suggests that the time is ripe to attempt establishing a long-term dia-
logue between the two communities with a view to foster cross-fertilization
of ideas. In particular, it is felt that the present moment is appropriate for
reflection, reassessment and eventually some synthesis, with the aim of pro-
viding the field a self-portrait of where it currently stands and where it is
going as a whole, and hopefully suggesting new directions.
The goal of this special issue was precisely to consolidate research efforts
in this area, and to provide a timely and coherent picture of the state of the
art in the field. Late in 2013, a call for papers was issued which resulted in 19
submissions and, after a careful review process, nine papers were accepted for
publication. The papers were reviewed by philosophically inclined pattern
recognition researchers as well as professional philosophers interested in the
epistemological problems posed by our domain.
The first two papers in the special issue address questions pertaining to
1See, e.g., the ECML 2001 workshop on “Machine learning as experimen-
tal philosophy of science” (http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/∼korb/posml.html) with
the associated special issue of Minds and Machines (vol. 14, no. 4,
2004), the book by G. Harman (a philosopher) and S. Kulkarni (an en-
gineer) on Reliable Reasoning (MIT Press, 2007), the NIPS 2011 Workshop
on “Philosophy and machine learning” (http://www.dsi.unive.it/PhiMaLe2011/),
and the ICPR 2014 tutorial on “Philosophical aspects of pattern recognition”
(http://www.icpr2014.org/tutorialpages/philosophicalaspects).
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the nature of pattern recognition research. In the first paper, entitled “Pat-
tern recognition between science and engineering: A red herring?” Marcello
Pelillo, Teresa Scantamburlo and Viola Schiaffonati aim at reopening a classic
discussion as to whether the field of pattern recognition should be consid-
ered a part of science or of engineering. Using recent developments in both
the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology, they show how
the traditional opposition between science and engineering, motivated by the
assumption that the former aims at “truth” and the latter aims at “use,” is
largely surpassed by contemporary philosophical enquiry, and they instead
appear to stand to each other “in a kind of circular, symbiotic relationship.”
Specific historical examples taken from the pattern recognition and allied
fields seem to support this idea, and suggest that our domain should indeed
be taken as a case-study for philosophers interested in the interplay between
science and technology. Motivated by this analysis, the authors offer some
final speculations concerning the notion of progress and performance evalu-
ation.
In the next paper, entitled “On unifiers, diversifiers, and the nature of
pattern recognition,” Gavin Brown explores another dichotomy which origi-
nates from a distinction between two kinds of scientific styles famously put
forward by the eminent theoretical physicist Freeman Dyson. According to
Dyson, scientists can be divided into two groups, the unifiers and the di-
versifiers. Two kinds, as Dyson suggested, typified by two cities, Athens
and Manchester, and by two great scientists, Einstein and Rutheford, re-
spectively. Charles Darwin also made a similar distinction between splitters
(“those who make many species”) and lumpers (“those who make few”).
3
Brown investigates to what extent this distinction can be transferred from
the realm of natural sciences to the field of pattern recognition, and discusses
it in relation with other well-known dichotomies in philosophy and science.
After speculating about the value of such dichotomies, he concludes that in
our own field, although pure unifiers and pure diversifiers do in fact exist,
they are rare and most researchers typically sit on the spectrum between the
two, adopting “unifying perspectives one day, and be diversifying the next.”
In his paper “The disembodied predictor stance,” Loizos Michael studies
pattern recognition scenarios, which are typically encountered in the social
sciences, whereby the announcement of a prediction by an agent can poten-
tially influence the very outcome the agent is trying to predict. Examples
of such situations abound and include predicting the stock market or the
outcome of an election, and can be found in the context of spam filtering or,
more generally, adversarial learning. Michael’s starting point is the observa-
tion that most research in pattern recognition adopts a “disembodied stance”
and is therefore intrinsically unable to deal with this kind of problems. He
then invites us to abandon this stance and, after a careful examination of the
issues at stake, devotes the rest of the paper to describe a formal “introspec-
tive forecasting” framework which tries to accommodate this request. Cen-
tral to Michael’s argument is the idea of interconnectedness, a form of holism
which postulates that the characteristics of the world are not completely un-
related, a notion which is also invoked within the probably approximately
correct (PAC) learning framework.
The next three papers in the special issue deal with different aspects re-
lated to representational issues in pattern recognition and machine learning.
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In the paper entitled “Semantics of object representation in machine learn-
ing,” Birkan Tunc¸ discusses the need for directing philosophical attention
to the data modeling problem in machine learning. Indeed, as he notices,
while much attention has been devoted so far to the philosophical aspects
related to the inferential process in machine learning, little work has been
done concerning the semantics of object representations and their epistemic
justification. The paper is a preliminary attempt to fill in this gap. After
reviewing the basic ingredients of Aristotelian and Galilean epistemologies,
Tunc¸ tries to elucidate several philosophical concepts employed (often tac-
itly) in machine learning, namely abstraction, idealization and latent (or
theoretical) variables.
In the next paper, entitled “The dissimilarity representation for finding
universals from particulars by an anti-essentialist approach,” Robert Duin
draws our attention to another all-important philosophical topic, namely the
dualism between the essentialist and the anti-essentialist perspectives, the
former postulating the existence of intrinsic, “essential” attributes for ob-
jects and categories, the latter denying it. He analyzes how these two views
correspond to different types of representations in pattern recognition, and
argues that the dissimilarity representation, which he introduced earlier, can
be best understood adopting an anti-essentialist outlook. The paper touches
upon other well-known philosophical issues, such as the dualism between par-
ticulars and universals and consciousness, and concludes with a pessimistic
note concerning the possibility for a pattern recognition machine to ever
attain a form of universal knowledge.
The paper by Frank van der Velde, entitled “Computation and dissipative
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dynamical systems in neural networks for classification,” offers a contribution
to the classical debate between empiricists and rationalists concerning the
very possibility of inductive inferences. Using a mathematical analysis of the
classification behavior of feedforward neural networks, van der Velde shows
that, under certain conditions, forms of induction are indeed possible. The
paper explores the role of representation and the nature of the underlying
forms of processing and advocates a dynamical system perspective to pattern
recognition. Obviously, not all dynamical systems are suited to this purpose
as the nature of cognition imposes constraints upon all possible choices. The
paper suggests restricting our attention to dissipative systems, whereby the
volume of an initial region in state space decreases over time, and discusses
how the dissipative nature of networks could have consequences in terms of
the representational power and the learning abilities of neural networks.
The next paper by Christian Hennig entitled “What are the true clus-
ters?” offers an analysis of the clustering problem using constructivist phi-
losophy and the notion of active scientific realism recently proposed by Cam-
bridge historian and philosopher of science Hasok Chang. It is argued that
the notion of a “true cluster” depends on both the context and the clustering
aims, and the paper suggests various desirable characteristics of clusterings
as well as various approaches to formalize the notion of context-dependent
truth. After discussing some implications of the proposed approach, Hennig
concludes the paper by observing that the philosophical considerations put
forward here could have a wider applicability in other areas of data analysis
whereby the notion of “natural” truth is seen as problematic (see also the
paper which opens this special issue).
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Pedro Ortega, in his paper entitled “Subjectivity, Bayesianism, and causal-
ity,” tries to advance a mathematical definition of subjectivity within the
framework of Bayesian probability theory. To this end, he draws from the
psychoanalytic theory of the subject developed by French philosopher Jacques
Lacan. After establishing an intriguing parallel between Lacan’s theory and
Bayesian probability theory, Ortega notices that Bayesian theory is not quite
a complete subjectivist theory as it lacks an important ingredient, namely
the notion of causal intervention, which in Lacan’s theory corresponds to
the so-called objet petit a (a term that apparently Lacan did not want to be
translated). Motivated by this consideration, the rest of the paper tries to
fill in this gap and develops an abstract model of the subject which accom-
modates causal interventions in a measure-theoretic formalization obtained
using ideas from game theory.
In the paper which closes the special issue, entitled “The nature of the vi-
sual field, a phenomenological analysis,” Jan Koenderink, Andrea van Doorn
and Johan Wagemans explore the “mysteries” associated to our visual aware-
ness and its spatial form (the “visual field”) using experimental phenomenol-
ogy. As the authors point out, the visual field is a mental entity of some
geometrical nature. But it is a kind of geometry which is difficult to describe
and we cannot help ignoring qualities and meanings. In an attempt to un-
derstand this geometry, the authors advocate the use of an abstract model
of the genesis of visual awareness and discuss several important distinctions
of geometrical nature. This description is confronted with known principles
of artistic practice and turns out to be related to fields such as ethology,
aesthetics and Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms.
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I hope that the collection of papers assembled in this special issue will
provide a timely and interesting sample of research at the interface between
pattern recognition and philosophy and will foster further work in this ex-
citing and largely unexplored area. Working on this special issue has been a
unique, intellectually rewarding experience. I would like to thank Gabriella
Sanniti di Baja for her advice and support in establishing this initiative,
and Jefeery Alex, Journal Manager of Pattern Recognition Letters, for orga-
nizing the review process. I am also grateful to the authors for submitting
their work to the special issue and to the reviewers for their careful work in
evaluating all the submissions.
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